Whatever became of the Green Deal?

The UK ‘zero carbon homes’ policy was first announced in 2006 by the then-Labour chancellor Gordon Brown. The initial plan was for all new build houses to be ‘zero emission’ by 2016, with the emphasis heavily on energy saving by good building design and full insulation.  It was something of a maximal demand. In the extreme, fully implemented, it could mean no external energy imports at all, with energy demand minimised and then met entirely by ‘on house’ renewables, presumably mostly solar, backed up by biomass and possible micro wind units where viable. It was specified that ‘off-site renewable contributions can only be used where these are directly supplied to the dwellings by private wire arrangement’ i.e. directly from local sources. The aim was clearly to avoid imports of commercial energy via the grid, even if this was wholly or partly green energy.

However, after objections from house-builders and developers, based in part on the allegedly high cost of meeting the new energy performance rules, the criteria and rules as outlined in the linked Codes for Sustainable Housing were progressively watered down. For example, on the demand side, it was decided to exclude power used for electronic devices and white goods (e.g. fridges) and that logically enough led on to exclude electricity used to power heat pumps. However, that could be a big concession – heating is the major part of domestic energy use. On the supply side, it was decided that imports from some external grid linked renewables sources could after all be used, along with a range of other so called ‘allowable solutions’, including carbon offsetting i.e. buying in carbon credits from projects like tree planting elsewhere.

The original aim of the Zero Carbon Homes policy had been for all the measures to be ‘in’ or ‘on’ house, following the so called ‘Merton rule’, as developed by Merton Council, keen to ensure that building developers did not try to sidestep stringent energy saving rules, for example by relying on imported green power. Views differ on the wisdom of that, especially as applied to individual houses.  It is clearly important for house builders to pay proper attention to energy saving in their house designs and to incorporate in /on house renewables where viable. PV can certainly help and so might solar heating and some other microgen devices e.g. heat pumps in off-gas grid areas. However, getting fully to zero carbon for heat and power that way would be hard and pricey in many locations: to do that, importing some top up green power from more efficient large-scale wind farms in windy sites arguably makes more economic and environmental sense.

The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government’s 2013 consultation on proposed changes to the scheme said ‘the government recognises that it would not be cost-effective at this time, affordable or technically feasible to meet the zero carbon homes standard in all cases solely through measures on the dwelling itself, like fabric insulation, energy efficient services, and/or renewable energy generation measures (e.g. solar panels). Therefore, the government proposes that house builders can achieve the zero carbon standard by mitigating the remaining emissions ‘off-site’, in effect a kind of carbon offsetting or abatement’: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/next-steps-to-zero-carbon-homes-allowable-solutions

It offered a three tier approach, in-house efficiency, on/in/near house renewables and bought in extra power.  ‘Requirements for fabric energy efficiency and carbon compliance are to be achieved by measures incorporated within or on the development site, including by direct connection to community energy schemes. They set a minimum threshold for onsite measures’. Note the inclusion of community schemes: it is no longer necessary to do everything in/on one isolated house; ‘connected measures (e.g. a heat network)’ are also accepted for the core approach. Certainly, linking into district heating networks may make more sense than domestic scale micro-CHP in urban areas.

The key point though is that the in/on/near house measures can be topped up with additional off site ‘allowable solutions’, which could involve the house developer ‘contracting with a third party Allowable Solutions provider for them to deliver carbon abatement measures sufficient to meet the house builders’ obligations.’  But it could also involve ‘making a payment which is directed to a fund which then invests in projects which will deliver carbon abatement on their behalf. The payment would be based on a fixed price which would be subject to periodic review’.  A big let out clause! Moreover, it is left to the developer to choose, although the consultation asked whether there should be a prescribed list to provide house-builders with certainty and a clear indication of measures which are ‘allowed’. It pointed out though that this might be inflexible and reduce ‘the ability for new ideas to be brought forward and could stifle innovation’. There could also be definitional problems.  Similarly, for schemes like district heating, only part of which fed housing.

The government did look at the idea of having mandatory scheme under which ‘Local authorities would collect Allowable Solutions payments from development in their area through a local levy and fund Allowable Solutions projects in their locality according to local priorities for carbon abatement’, but (no surprise) decide against recommending it, though local councils would be able to offer allowable solutions to developers. But in its response to the consultation, it accepted most the rest:  https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/next-steps-to-zero-carbon-homes-allowable-solutions

As an interesting coda to this, in 2014, the Government noted that it had ‘not considered support for carbon capture and storage or nuclear power in the context of allowable solutions. However, the criteria based approach set out in the consultation for identifying appropriate carbon abatement measures would require that measures will need to bring forward additional, verifiable carbon savings at a cost effective price. Given carbon capture and storage, and nuclear power, would have high upfront costs, they would be unlikely to be cost-effective.’ So here we have the government saying that nuclear and CCS are too expensive. http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2014-10-23/211768/

As can be seen, if all these exceptions and allowable options were taken on board, the Zero Carbon Home might really be more like ‘50% carbon’ or less. Clearly it was on the way out, and in 2015, by which time the Conservatives were ruling alone, the zero carbon goal was in effect scraped, along with linked plans for new building regulations. The announcement on this was made as part of a government report, ‘Fixing the foundations: Creating a more prosperous nation’, which said the scrapping of the two regulations was designed to ‘reduce net regulations on housebuilders’. That was not well received by environmental groups: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/10/uk-scraps-zero-carbon-home-target

There was an attempt (via the House of Lords) to repeal the move, but that failed. A Department of Communities and Local Government spokesman said: ‘We are already building some of the most energy efficient homes in the world. Our current standards are tough and already have the full support of the industry. Our aim is to speed up house building and not add extra costs and bureaucracy. We do not need extra legislation as existing legislation is already in place to allow energy performance standards to be set in Building Regulations.’ https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/zero-carbon-homes-policy-scrapped-again/10006475.article

The basic Code system has been retained and is still valuable. However, the language used has begun to change to ‘Low Carbon Houses’, and the fully zero carbon concept seems to have slid out of focus.  Some might say that was sensible. It had been very ambitious, certainly when initially proposed, and 2016 was arguably unrealistic for a ‘zero’ target date. But the effective removal, or at least softening, of tough criteria for building emissions is arguably not something to be celebrated.

This and the previous post are edited from the coverage of UK energy policy in Dave Elliott’s latest book: ‘Renewable energy in the UK: past, present and future’ Palgrave:  www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783030047641 

Carrots and sticks: Public participation & consent in energy planning

The wide adoption of renewables will require public consent and, arguably, new, more open, approaches to planning control. A new study by Richard Cowell from Cardiff University and Patrick Divine-Wright from Exeter University looks at how we have been doing so far and  asks ‘how have decision-making procedures and support measures for energy infrastructure in the UK changed in the period 2008–2017? How have the changes been justified and how have the publics to be engaged been represented? How has the state struck balances between openness and closure around what can be subject to debate, and what does this say about how public engagement intersects with energy transitions?’

The framing of these questions reflects a concern for democratic participation, but recent history seems to show that, in practice, what has emerged has often just been an exercise in winning consents for technology choices already made by the government, usually reflecting private sector commercial aims. So the planning system is adjusted accordingly. In 2011, Eric Pickles, then a Tory planning minister, commented ‘We need a system that always says ‘yes’ to the right sorts of development’.

The official ‘wish list’ clearly includes nuclear power and shale gas fracking, both of which are highly controversial and unpopular, but both of which have been pushed hard by the government- even to the extent of offering cash incentives for accepting fracking or nuclear plants and (especially) nuclear waste repositories. Offshore wind is still on the list, and is getting support, but on shore wind has fallen off the wish list. Indeed, possibly reflecting the views of the allegedly strongly anti-wind view of Tory shires, it has been blocked by tighter planning controls and the withdrawal of access to financial support. The same has happened to some large allegedly invasive solar projects. So, on a simple view, what we are seeing is the promotion of centrally chosen options and resistance to those considered un-desirable.

However, this study suggests that it’s more complicated than that. Clearly, the government has sought to win consent directly for its chosen options (by community bribes/rewards if necessary), but it has also changed the planning system at all levels. Certainly some projects will be widely seen as undesirable and should be blocked – that is what we expect of the planning system. But while there may be specific local issues for some technologies, what we are seeing now is a systemic approach to the planning and policy system, with on one had some generic technologies being blocked while others are heavily pushed, with the local planning system and wider national policy development system both being changed, limiting the range of issues that can be discussed at the local level. So, for example, once established, admittedly after some public consultation, the central governments Nuclear Policy Statement had been set in stone- there can be no debate over the need for nuclear. Similarly for fracking- which is being pushed through the local planning systems hard, almost by edict, despite strong local opposition. Not much democracy there. 

In some cases, however, the government had attempted to bloc options it considered undesirable by, at least ostensibly, strengthening local democratic processes, empowering local anti-wind campaigns via changes in the planning system. A bow to populism. But that hasn’t worked well for the government in the case of nuclear waste- local councils, newly empowered, have resisted repository plans. So local democracy can be a two-edged sword. Although there is still the option of calling in projects for central government oversight, as has happened in the case of some local wind and solar project that somehow got through! It may yet also happen with nuclear waste. It has to go somewhere and with even more soon on the way from the proposed new plants…

At the same time, and a little confusingly, the government has also backed moves to local ownership of wind & PV projects, and to offering of other local benefits and incentives. A mixed bag then, though mostly consistent if the elite power model implicit in the analysis above is used. The academic study by Cowell et al however seeks to go beyond that approach and to explain all this as being part of an attempt to balance democratic ‘openness’ and engagement, which some see as vital part of a successful energy transition, with technocratic ‘closure’, on the basis of a need to reduce planning delays. The authors say ‘we are not endorsing the approach to decision-making of the UK government’, but claim that ‘steering towards any particular energy pathway, and navigating the shifting infrastructure requirements it creates, is likely to entail steps that structure and manage the scope for public engagement, requiring decisions about which issues are open for contestation at which stage in the policy and decision-making process. This may require balances to be struck between different dimensions of justice, in the light of the situations that certain energy infrastructures create’.

This seems a little apologetic. It is true that decisions have to be made, and delays can be economically wasteful, but lack of wide engagement can be a recipe for social unrest which can have economic and political consequences. Attempts to ‘depoliticise’ planning will just push political pressures elsewhere. In a democracy that may ultimately mean that a new government, with more attractive policies and plans, is chosen. But it seems foolish to go to the wire over every issue. Surely planning can be made more responsive?  Or are we  hopelessly fractious, contrarian and ungovernable?

The economics sometimes clears the air, but not always. For example, it’s hard to see, in economic terms, why Hinkley is going ahead, while much cheaper on-shore wind is being blocked.  Environmental factors are also often deployed in odd way- shale gas is backed while zero carbon biogas gets mostly sidelined.  It is reasonable for there to be debates on issues like this, especially when they present themselves locally. Some local objections may of course be frivolous or a refection of minority views, and some decisions may always be unpopular, with views continuing to differ. So some difficult choices do sometimes have to be made, even if based on views that can be challenged. However, ploughing ahead single-mindedly into direct confrontation, backed up by the police and the courts, as for example in the case of some local fracking protests, is not a sign of an efficient planning and policy system, but of one that is failing.  www.tandfonline.com/eprint/TaqH3vgeKHHyuf7V5WMQ/full

Energy security is a key energy system planning issue. Not one that is likely to show up much directly in local contestations, but important nevertheless. As the UKERC argues in a new study, energy efficiency and system flexibility, along with diversity and balancing, are vital for robust and resilient energy systems. However, a tacit awareness of these principles may shape how people respond to specific projects. Though in practice there may be a need for some trade offs! www.ukerc.ac.uk/asset/EA9A39B6%2D3B36%2D4F68%2DA8CA3DA84A48131D/                     

Technology and the future: automation

Technological change can have mixed social and environmental impacts, some good, some bad, and some uncertain. Over the past few decades, social and political movements have emerged seeking to redirect technological development and steer it toward more environmentally and socially beneficial paths, challenging the technological status quo. In the energy field, some progress has been made in that regard, with renewables now winning battles. But there are many other fields where progress has been more uncertain. One of them concerns the development of new production technologies based on automatic systems and cybernetic controls- automation.

Some see automation in ‘liberatory’ terms, freeing mankind from the curse of backbreaking, mindless work. Other see it as destroying the technical skills, economic remuneration and social satisfactions associated with productive work. Both camps often allude to an arguably mythical golden past, when life was fuller and work was less alienated by technology. The anti-automation camp says that this happy state will finally be lost for ever, as technology runs out of control and humanity becomes its servant, while the pro-automation camp says that technology can release us to explore a work-free utopia.

It is certainly true that we have lost much that was valuable as industrialisation has spread, and there is much nostalgia for the bucolic past. Equally there was very little that was romantic about the hard-graft drudgery that most people faced. Technology has lessened that, or at least changed it into new forms of drudgery.  What will automation do? More of the same or something new?

A newly published Spokesman book ‘Delinquent Genius’ by Mike Cooley argues that we can in fact, and indeed must, make sure the new technology is human centred. We can’t stop it, but we can direct it so that automation enhances skills rather than replaces them- creating meaningful and creative work. The artisan culture beloved of William Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement in the UK only involved a small minority. Cooley seems to be arguing that human centred technology can expand that, so that all can participate.

He starts off with a damning critique of modern industrial society, an inhumane human creation of clever but careless ‘delinquent geniuses’ which seems hell bent on destroying the planet without thought. However, he goes beyond lamentation to offer an alternative path. His approach is based, in part, on the work he has done on machining. Modern semi automated lathe tools and the like are run using pre-programed instructions, based on designs created using computers. Computer Aided Design (CAD) may give designers some freedom to create new ideas, but the whole subsequent production system squeezes out the tacit knowledge of materials and how to work with them that typifies craft work.  What the system wants is speed and reliability, so as to reduce costs. So it goes for increasingly standardised products made in standardised ways with little opportunity for originality or diversity. Cooley, by contrast, want us to re-connect with imagination, intuition and creativity. So his Human Centred machines allow the machinist to take back control.

He sees this approach as generalisable. Rather than trying to extract expertise, skills and tacit knowledge from expert practitioners and codify them in so called ‘expert systems’, with central computer systems then being used by non experts, he wants to spread expertise and offer opportunities for all to participate, inputting their own ideas too. Put baldly like that, it may seem Utopian.  But Cooley points to the burst of creative ideas that emerged from ‘ordinary people’ when given the chance to contribute to the development of the 1970’s Lucas workers’ alternative plan for socially useful products.

Cooley was a leader in that initiative and in the subsequent community engagement work of the GLCs Technology Networks. Though they have gone, there are signs of similar approaches re-emerging, as in so-called ‘Fablabs’ and ‘make spaces’ - centres for people to explore new tech ideas. 3D printing offers one interesting new tool for inventive ‘bespoke production’. More generally, there is also interest in developing new alternative plans. It’s some way to go to being an approach that will sweep the world, but a start has been made, and Cooley’s wide-ranging new book will help underpin it.

What though is the final aim in terms of automation? At one point Cooley talks of ‘minimising that part of work that was backbreaking or soul destroying’, and most people would be in favour of that. Certainly most standard mass production can and should be 100% automated, but will more creative and inventive jobs be available for those made redundant? A small elite apart, that’s not what we’ve got now: for most, all that’s on offer is just retail, warehouse and low grade service jobs, with technology adding more pressure, until those jobs also disappear. Breaking out of this and working in local co-ops or community  organisations is an option for some, and the Labour Party has talked of expanding that sector, but what sort of work will be available there?  Just the stuff that can’t be automated but needs doing and is worth doing. That too usually has a range of tacit human skills- though even in the personal service sector, robots are being proposed. So the battle continues…

Is there a way out? Labour’s old Clause 4 talked of aiming ‘to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service’.

That is still arguably a good aim! But it is interesting that it starts off with a distinction between workers by hand and by brain, implying there is a fixed and permanent separation. Cooley’s argument, taken to its logical conclusion, is that there should not be, and that the artificial distinction between ‘brain’ and ‘manual’ work ignores the valuable tacit knowledge and skills associated with what is called manual work.  Recognising that, and also the social value of non-commercially orientated work, could go some way to creating a society in which the social benefits of automation (less dull work, more time for living, caring, and engaging in society) would outweigh its social costs in terms of job losses. 

That reordering of social and economic values would probably require a radical political transformation, something Cooley avoids exploring directly in this book.  His previous book, ‘Architect or Bee?’ is more didactically inclined. This one is more a thoughtful philosophical exploration, covering a very wide range of ideas, issues and experiences, but welding them into a timely and challenging treatise on what he sees as our odd relationship with technology and scientific reductionism.  At base what he is saying that it has allowed us to become too detached from the world: we are spectators rather than participants - trying to be objective when we also need to be subjective, intellectual when we also need be tactile.  With all of that impacting on how we view and value work, and also on how we live. https://spokesmanbookshop.com/Delinquent-Genius